Below is the Executive Summary Report of the Mamasapno Clash that took the lives of 67 people including the 44 PNP-SAF Commandos:
On January 25, 2015,
sixty-seven (67) Filipinos died in Mamasapano, Maguindanao as a result of an
encounter triggered by operation Plan (Oplan) Exodus.
The goal of Oplan Exodus
was to neutralize high value targets (HVTs) who were international
terrorists—i.e., Zkulkifli Bin Hir/Zulkifli Abhir (Marwan); Ahamad Akmad atabl
Usman (Usman); and Amin Baco (Jihad).
Forty-four (44) members
of the Special Aciton Force (SAF)—considered as the elite unit of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) against terrorism and internal security
threats-lost their lives in Mamasapano, while sixteen (16) other SAF members
sustained severe injuries.
The tragic incident in
Mamasapano raised several questions. How could a group of elite forces be
massacred? Who was responsible for their deaths? What caused the traffic
encounter in Mamasapano? Who were the hostile forces encountered by the SAF
troops?
The Board of Inquiry
(BOI) was created by the Philippine National Police (PNP) primarily to
investigate the facts regarding Oplan Exodus and to provide recommendations in
order to address such possible lapses.
The methodology used by
the BOI in preparing this report is described in Chapter 1.
The BOI notes that the
information obtained from certain key personalities were limited. For
instance the BI failed to secure a interview with the President Benigno Aquino
III, suspended Chief PNP (CPNP) Alan Purisima, Chief-of-Staff AFP (CSAFP) General
Gregorio Catapang, and Lieutenant General Rustico Guerrero. All concerned
officers of the Armed Fores of the Philippines (AFP) refused to be interviewed
by the BOI despite repeated requests.
The BOI did not have
access to other crucial information such as contents of Short Messaging System
(SMS) or text messages, and logs of calls and SMS. BOI's requests for the
submission of cellular phones for forensic examination were also denied by
CSAFP Catapang, Guerrero, suspended CPNP Purisima and AFP officers. However,
the sworn statement of suspended CPNP Purisima included a transcript of his SMS
exchanges with the President on January 25, 2015.
Despite the foregoing
limitations, the BOI succeeded in conducting several interviews, obtaining
various types of evidence, processing and reviewing hundreds of
documents, and conducting ocular inspection in Mamasapano to produce this
Report.
Based on the records,
Oplan Exodus was approved by the President and implemented by suspended CPNP
Purisima and the Director of SAF (Napeñas) Getulio Napeñas, to the exclusion of
the Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine National Police (OIC PNP) Leonardo
Espina, who is the concurrent Deputy CPNP for Operations.
On December 16,2014, the
OIC-PNP issued a Special Order No. 9851 which directed suspended CPNP Purisima
and other suspended PNP officers, to “cease and desist from performing the
duties and functions of their respective offices during the pendency of [their
respective cases filed by the Ombudsman] until its termination.”
Napeñas and suspended
CPNP Purisima ignored the established PNP Chain of Command by excluding OIC-PNP
Espina in planning and execution of Oplan Exodus. Napeñas and suspended CPNP
also failed to inform the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG)
Mar Roxas about Oplan Exodus, and made no prior coordination with the AFP.
Based on the records. SILG and OIC-PNO were informed of Oplan Exodus through a
phone call by suspended CPNP Purisima at 05:50 a.m. on January 25, 2015. SILG
learned about the operation when he got an SMS from Police Director Charles
Calima Jr. at 07:43 a.m. on January 2, 2015.
The participation of the
suspended CPNP in Oplan Exodus was carried out with the knowledge of the
President. Records revealed instances when the suspended CPNP met with the
President and Napeñas to discuss Oplan Exodus on January 25, 2015.
Records also show that
suspended CPNP Purisima failed to deliver his assurances to coordinate with the
AFP. At a crucial stage of the crisis, the suspended CPNP Purisima provided
inaccurate information from an unofficial source, which further jeopardized the
situation of the 55th SAC and 84th Seaborne in Mamasapano.
There are indications
that Napeñas may not have considered differing opinions raised by his
subordinate commanders. The mission planning appears to have been done by a
group of officers and not by a planning team, with inputs heavily influenced by
Napeñas. Subordinate commanders expressed that Napeñas had unrealistic planning
assumptions such as the swift delivery of artillery fire and the immediate
facilitation of ceasefire.
Napeñas chose to employ
a “way-in/way-out, by foot and night-only” infiltration and exfiltration
Concept of Operation (CONOPS) for Oplan Exodus. During an interview with BOI,
Napeñas admitted that he expected casualty of around ten (10) SAF Commandos to
accomplish the mission.
Napeñas also admitted
that key variables for the success of Oplan Exodus, such as the coordination
with the Sixth Infantry Division (6ID), and with the Coordinating Committee o
the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) were
not thoroughly considered in the mission planning. The established protocols
and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of the AFP, CCCH and AHJAG in
providing reinforcement and effecting ceasefire were not sufficiently
discussed.
Napeñas proposed to the
President the adoption of the time “Time-On-Target” (TOT) concept of
coordination for Oplan Exodus. Application for the TOT concept restricted
disclosure of information to a limited number of persons until the target is
engaged. It appears that Napeñas' primary consideration for adopting the TOT
concept was operational security (OPSEC) to reduce the risk of having Oplan
Exodus compromised.
The records show that when
the President gave instructions to CPNP Purisima and Napeñas to coordinate with
the AFP, Napeñas raised his concern that the AFP might be compromised due to
intermarriages of some AFP personnel with the local people. He cited previous
SAF operations against the same HVTs that were coordinated with the AFP.
Suspended CPNP Purisima and Mendez shared the qualms of Napeñas.
When Napeñas proposed to
the President the adoption of the TOT concept for Oplan Exodus, the President
remained silent.
Police Superintendent
Raymund Train of the 84 SAC (one of the survivor from the Mamasapano encounter)
attested that, in case of heavy enemy fire, the first planned mitigating action
for Oplan Exodus was indirect artillery fire support from the AFP. The second
planned mitigating action was the commissioning of the peace process mechanisms
to facilitate ceasefire.
However, Napeñas failed
to consider the consequences of the TOT concept vis-a-vis the required
mitigating actions. He appeared to have relied heavily on the verbal commitment
of the suspended CPNP Purisima to arrange for the needed AFP support.
Coordination with the 6ID and CCCH and AHJAG was planned to be made at TOT,
that was, upon engagement of the target. There was no plan for close air support.
With respect to the
peace process mechanisms as mitigating actions in Oplan Exodus, the required
coordination to trigger such mechanisms (such as a ceasefire) were not
followed.
Prior communication with
Brigadier General Carlito Galvez could have informed Napeñas that, in past
experiences, a ceasefire could only be achieved after at least six (6) hours of
negotiation.
By the time the AFP was
informed about Oplan Exodus, a hostile encounter between the SAF Commandos and
various armed groups in Mamasapano had already ensued.
Considering that the
CONOPS adopted the way-in/way-out-in/way- that the CONOPS adopted heavy support
from other SAF Commandos to secure the withdrawal route of the Main Effort
(Seaborne). The plan was for the 84th Seaborne to link-up with 55th SAC and
progressively with 4SAB units along the withdrawal route.
The delay in movement of
the Seaborne affected the movement of the 4SAB and other reserve forces. When
the containment and reserve forces arrived at the Vehicle Drop-off Point
(VDOP), the situation in the area of operation was already hostile. Heavy sound
of gunfire were heard coming from the location of the 55th SAC. The
troops immediately disembarked, organized themselves and rushed to their
designed waypoints (WP). Midway between WP8 and WP9, the reinforcing troops
came under heavy enemy fire. The exfiltration route became dominated by hostile
forces. The Ground Comander at the Advance Command Post (ACP) was not able to
maneuver the troops to break enemy lines and force their way to reinforce the
55th SAC Commandos near WP12. Ineffective communication system further
exacerbated the situation.
During the site survey
in Mamasapano on February 24, 2015, the BOI took note of the unfavorabe terrain
faced by the reinforcing troops. The wide terrain between their location and
that of the 55th SAC was literally flat without adequate cover and concealment.
Tactical maneuvers, such as the “Bounding Overwatch” technique,
would have been difficult and may result to more casualties. According to the
platoon leaders, enemy fires were coming from all directions which prevented
them from maneuvering and reinforcing 55th SAC.
In a joint interview
with BOI, Mayor Ampatuan of Mamasapano and the Barangay Chairman and Officials
of Tukanalipao in Mamasapno claimed that in the past, armed elements would
readily withdraw from the encounter side whenever white phosphorus rounds were
delivered by Field Artillery Batter of the 6ID PA.
In an interview with
BOI, Napeñas claimed that the 6ID immediately provided artillery fire support
when one of its infantry company was harassed by armed elements sometime in
late November or early December 2014.
However, during the
execution of Oplan Exodus, three (3) white phosphorous rounds were delivered
late in the afternoon and not earlier in the morning when such rounds could
have mattered most to the 84th Seaborne and the 55th SAC.
SAF coordinated and
requested for indirect artillery fire support from the 1st Mechanized Brigade
as early as 07:30 a.m. The Brigade Commander of the 1st Mech Brigade,
Colonel Gener Del Rosario sought clearance for artillery fire from the 6ID
Commander, Major General Edmundo Pangilinan. Howver, of the three
recommendations given by Col. Del Rosario, only the dispatches of infantry
support and mechanized support were approved by the MGEN Pangilinan. The
request for indirect artillery fire was put on hold since, according to
Pangilinan, they still lacked details as mandated by their protocol.
Based on the records,
MGEN Pangilinan took it upon himself to withhold artillery fire support in
consideration of the peace process and artillery fire protocols. However,
pursuant to AA, PA SOP No. 4, that decision could have been made by a Brigade
Commander like Col. Del Rosario.
The primary objective of
Oplan Exodus to get the HVTs was not fully completed. Two of its targets, Jihad
and Usman, were able to escape and remain at-large.
Three hundred ninety-two (392) SAF Commandos were mobilized for
Oplan Exodus. Forty-four SAF members lost their lives in carrying out this
mission. In discovering the facts that lead to such deaths, this Report
stresses the importance of command responsibility: “A commander is
responsible for what his unit does or fails to do.”
FINDINGS:
1. Chain of Command
The Chain of Command in
the PNP was violated. The President, the suspended CPNP Purisima and the former
Director SAF Napeñas kept the information to themselves and deliberately failed
to inform the OIC PNP and the SILG. The Chain of Command should be observed in
running mission operations.
For instance, the Manual
for PNP Fundamental Doctrine,1 requires the Commander to
discharge his responsibilities through a Chain of Command. Such Manual provides
that it is only in urgent situations when intermediate commanders may be
bypassed. in such instances, intermediate commanders should be notified of the
context of the order as soon as possible by both the commander issuing the
order and the commander receiving it.
With respect to Oplan
Exodus, the Chain of Command in the PNP should have been: OIC, CPNP PDDG Espina
(as senior commander) to Napeñas (as intermediate commander). PDG Purisima
could not legally form part of the Chain of Command by reason of his
suspension.
2. Command
Responsibility
The principle of Command
Responsibility demands that a commander is responsible for all his unit does or
fails to do. Command Responsibility cannot be delegated or passed-on to other
officers. Under the Manual of PNP Fundamental Doctrine, Command Responsibility
"can never be delegated otherwise it would constitute an abdication of his
role as a commander. He alone answers for the success or failure of his command
in all circumstances."
Based on all records,
Napeñas admitted that he has command responsibility with respect to Oplan
Exodus.
3. Coordination
The TOT coordination
concept, which limits the disclosure of information to only a few personnel, is
applicable only to ordinary police operations. This concept however does not
conform to the established and acceptable operational concepts and protocols of
the PNP. Even AFP commanders asserted that the TOT concept is alien to the
Armed Forces and runs counter to their established SOPs. Without coordination,
following the AFP definition, support to operating units such as artillery or
close air support is not possible since these entails preparations.
4. Operation Plan
Oplan Exodus was not
approved by the OIC-PNP. Napeñas dominated the mission planning, disregarding
inputs from his subordinate commanders on how the operation will be conducted.
The concept of the way-in/way-out, by foot and night-only infiltration and
exfiltration in an enemy controlled community with unrealistic assumptions was
a high-risk type of operation.
5. Execution
Oplan Exodus can never
be executed effectively because it was defective from the very beginning. Troop
movement was mismanaged, troops failed to occupy their positions, there was a
lack of effective communication among the operating troops, command and control
was ineffective and foremost, there was no coordination with the AFP forces and
peace mechanism entities (CCCH and AHJAG).
6. Command and Control
Command and control is
critical to a coordinated and collaborative response to the Mamasapano incident.
In Oplan Exodus, the SAF's TCP and ACP were plagued by failures of command and
control from the very start especially in the aspect of communication. As Oplan
Exodus unfolded, mobile communication devices was used as a primary mode of
communication. However, these devices fell short of what were needed to relay
real-time information and coordination of activities to and from the chain of
command.
Radio Operators were
assigned at the TCP one each for 84th Seaborne and 55th SAC. However, 55th SAC
and 84th Seaborne lost contact during the crucial moments of executing Oplan
Exodus. They had to rely on distinctive gunfire to approximate each other's
location. Radio net diagram was provided but failed when radio equipment bogged
down.
7. Logistics
Some of the ordinance
for M203 were defective. Although there were sufficient rounds of ammunition
for each operating troop, the overwhelming strength of the enemy caused the
troops to run out of ammunition. The common Motorola handheld radios failed
when submerged in water because these were not designed for military-type of
operations. The battery life was short because of wear and tear.
8. AFP Response
Artillery fire support
was factored in as one of the mitigating actions of the SAF. However, such
support was not delivered when needed. In consideration of the peace process,
AFP did not deliver the artillery fire support under the consideration of the
peace process, and on the absence of compliance with the required protocol. AFP
demanded prior coordination to enable them to react and deliver the requested
support. Nonetheless, the AFP sent infantry and mechanized units to reinforce
the SAF. White phosphorus artillery rounds were fired late in the afternoon.
However, by then, all of the 55th SAC lay dead except for one who was able to
escape.
Local PNP units wer not
fully utilized to reinforce the SAF. The reinforcement from the local and
Regional PNP units were not seriously factored-in during the mission planning
process.
9. Peace
Process<echanisms< div="" style="padding: 0px; margin:
0px;">
Officials of the CCCH
and AHJAG, when tapped by AFP, did their best to reinstate the ceasefire
between the SAF and MILF combatants. The participation of other armed groups
such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), private armed groups
(PAGs), and other armed civilians in the firefight delayed the ceasefire.
</echanisms<>
10. United States (US)
Involvement
The US was involved in
the intelligence operations and medical evacuations. No US personnel/troops
were involved in the actual combat operation. The US supported the operation by
providing technical support to enhance monitoring of the troops on the ground.
They were also involved
in the identification of Marwan through DNA analysis.
11. Post-Mission Actions
The report submitted by
the PNP Crime Laboratory shows that around four (4) SAF commandos with fatal
gunshot wounds (GSWs) to the head and at the mid-portion of the trunk were
deathblows delivered by shooting at close-range. In other words, not all the
forty-four (44) fatalities died during the actual firefight, but were literally
executed at close-range by the enemy.
A total of 16 SAF
firearms and one (1) cellphone were returned by the MILF. It was observed that
some parts of the returned firearms had been replaced.
CONCLUSIONS:
Based on the foregoing,
the following conclusions were drawn:
1. The President gave
the go-signal and allowed the execution of Oplan Exodus after the concept of
operations (CONOPS) was presented to him by Director of Special Action Force
(SAF) Director Getulio Napeñas.
2. The President allowed
the participation of the suspended Chief Philippine National Police (CPNP)
Police Director General Alan Purisima in the planning and execution of the
Oplan Exodus despite the suspension order of the Ombudsman.
3. The President
exercised his prerogative to deal directly with Napeñas instead of
Officer-in-Charge of the PNP (OIC-PNP) Police Deputy Director General Leonardo
Espina. While the President has the prerogative to deal directly with any of
his subordinates, the act of dealing with Napeñas instead of OIC-PNP Espina
bypassed the established PNP Chain of Command. Under the Manual for PNP
Fundamental Doctrine,2 the Chain of Command runs upward and
downward. Such Manual requires the commander to discharge his responsibilities
through a Chain of Command.
4. The suspended CPNP
Purisima violated the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman when
he participated in the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus. He also violated
the Special Order No. 9851 dated December 16, 2014 issued by OIC-PNP Espina,
directing him and other suspended PNP officers to "cease and desists from
performing the duties and functions of their respective offices during the pendency
of the case until its termination."
5. In the same meeting
where the President instructed Napeñas and suspended CPNP Purisima to
coordinate with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),3 PDG
Purisima thereafter said to Napeñas: "Ako na ang bahala kay
Catapang." The PNP Ethical Doctrine Manual cites, "Word of
Honor — PNP members' word is their bond. They stand by and commit to it."
The statement of Purisima may be construed as an assurance of providing the
coordination instructed by the President.
6. Suspended CPNP
Purisima provided inaccurate information to the President about the actual
situation on the ground when he sent text messaged to the President stating
that SAF Commandos were pulling out,4 and that they were
supported by mechanized and artillery support.5
7. Despite his knowledge
of the suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, Napeñas followed the
instructions of suspended CPNP Purisima not to inform OIC-PNP and the Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government (SILG) Mar Roxas about Oplan Exodus. This violated
the PNP Chain of Command.
8. Napeñas failed to
effectively supervise, control and direct personnel which resulted in heavy
casualties of the SAF Commandos. Under the Manual on Fundamental Doctrines,
Command Responsibility means that a commander is responsible for effectively
supervising, controlling and directing his personnel. Under that same doctrine,
a commander is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do.
9. Napeñas followed his
Time-on-Target (TOT) coordination concept despite the directive of the
president to coordinate with the AFP prior to the operation.
10. The TOT coordination
concept adopted by the SAF does not conform with the established and acceptable
operational concepts and protocols of the PNP.
11. The protocols of the
established peace process mechanisms, through the Coordinating Committee on the
Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), were not
observed during the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus.
12. The mission planning
of Oplan Exodus was defective due to: (1) poor analysis of the area of
operation; (2) unrealistic assumptions; (3) poor intelligence estimate; (4)
absence of abort criteria; (5) lack of flexibility in its CONOPS; (6)
inappropriate application of TOT; and (7) absence of prior coordination with
the AFP and AHJAG.
13. The following
factors affected the execution of CONOPS: (1) mismanaged movement plan from
staging area to Vehicle-Drop-Off Point (VDOP); (2) failure to occupy the
designated way points; (3) ineffective communication system among the operating
troops; (4) unfamiliarity with the terrain in the are of operation; (5)
non-adherence to the operational/tactical Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs);
(6) lack of situational awareness among commanders; and (6) breakdown in the
command and control.
14. Artillery support
from 6th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army (6ID-PA) was not delivered
when needed most because Major General Edmundo Pangilinan, Division Commander
of 6ID, considered the on-going peace process and protocols in the use of
artillery.
15. The lack of
situational awareness, limited cover and concealment, ineffective
communication, and sustained enemy fire prevented the 1st Special Action
Battalion (1SAB) and 4SAB containment forces from reinforcing the beleaguered
55th Special Action Company (SAC) troops.
16. CCCH and AHKJAG
undertook all efforts to reinstate the ceasefire. "Pintakasi" and the
loose command and control of the MILF leaders over their field forces
contributed to the difficulty in reinstating ceasefire.
17. Some of the radios
of the SAF Commandos were unreliable because these were not designed for
military-type tactical operations. The batteries had poor power-retention
capability due to wear-and-tear. Furthermore, SAF radios were not compatible
with AFP radios for interoperability.
18. There was a
breakdown of command and control at all levels due to ineffective and
unreliable communication among and between the operating units.
19. There are
indications that 55th SAC was not able to secure its perimeter, conduct
reconnaissance, occupy vantage positions and establish observation posts.
20. Several rounds of
ammunition of M203 grenade launchers were defective.
21. The United States
involvement was limited to intelligence sharing and medical evacuation. Only
SAF Commandos were involved in the actual combat operation of Oplan Exodus.
22. Autopsy reports
indicate that four (4) SAF Commandos were shot at close-range while they were
still alive. Records also indicate that possibility that some SAF Commandos
were stripped-off their protective vests prior to being shot at close-range.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Based on this Report's
findings and conclusions, the Board of Inquiry (BOI) recommends the following:
1. Where the facts of
this Report indicate possible violations of existing laws and regulations,
appropriate government agencies should pursue the investigation of the
Mamasapano incident to determind the criminal and/or administrative liabilities
of relevant government officials, the MILF and other individuals.
2. The AFP and PNP, in
coordination with OPAPP, should immediately review, clarify and strengthen the
Join AFP/PNP Operational Guideline for Ad Hoc Joint Action Group especially in
the area of coordination during Law Enforcement operations (LEO) against HVTs.
3. The AFP and PNP
should jointly review related provisions of their respective written manuals
and protocols to synchronize, reconcile and institutionalize inter-operability
not only between these two agencies but also with other relevant government
agencies. The National Crisis Management Core Manual (NCMC manual) could be one
of the essential references.
4. Crisis management
simulation exercises (similar to fire and earthquake drills) should be
regularly conducted among key players including local government units
particularly in conflict prone areas.
5. The PNP should review
its Police Operational procedures to cover operations similar to Oplan Exodus
and to clarify coordination issues.
7. The PNP should craft
its own Mission planning Manual and institutionalize its application in PNP law
enforcement operations.
8. The capabilities of
SAF and other PNP Maneuver Units for Move, Shoot, Protect, Communicate and
Close Air Support (CAS) should be enhanced.
9. The PNP should review
its supply management system to ensure operational readiness of munitions and
ordinance.
10. Cross-training
between the PNP and the AFP pertaining to management and execution of
military-type tactical operations should be institutionalized.
11. The PNP should
immediately grant 1 rank promotion to all surviving members of the 84th
Seaborne and PO2 Lalan for their heroism and gallantry in action, posthumous
promotion to the fallen 44 SAF commandos, and should give appropriate
recognition to all other participating elements.
The Full Text can be read: PNP BOI Report
It is now the 19th years anniversary of the Ozone Disco tragedy but still no justice for the victims.
